Germany until the present day, whilst juxtaposing this with Transylvanian

Saxon discourses on identity and nationhood. In so doing, this paper will argue that the discrepancy between the mutual expectations of the FRG and Transylvanian Saxon émigrés became very pronounced after 1989. This then has led to what appears to be the end of the Saxon community, as émigrés have found themselves torn between assimilation and a longing for a return to Transylvania.
After an overview of the German diaspora in East-Central Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union, we will briefly provide the relevant historical background for the case study of this article -the Transylvanian Saxons -from their arrival in Romania in the twelfth century until the fall of communism at the end of the 1980s. A discussion of West Germany's external minority policy after 1945 will then show how the continued application of ius sanguinis and the realities of the Cold War order fostered a relationship between the Federal Republic and its diaspora in Romania which allowed Transylvanian Saxons to cultivate notions of an "external homeland" that encouraged its diaspora to return "home".
The article will then look at contemporary issues. It will examine the changes to Germany's external minority policy in the post-Cold War period and analyse the effects of the immigration and citizenship reforms from the 1990s onwards on this group. In particular it will chart the shift away from Germany's welcoming stance towards ethnic Germans abroad to a notion of Germanness no longer solely based on ethnicity. Against this backdrop, this article will then highlight the emerging disconnect between Transylvanian Saxon immigrants and German society as ideas of identity, citizenship, and memory cultures differed between the host society and the new migrants, with the result that a reimagining of their former homeland -Romania -as their new "external homeland" has been taking place.
The German diaspora in East-Central Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union
Apart from a small number of countries in Western Europe (Denmark, Belgium, France and Italy), the German diaspora can be found in most Eastern and Central European states as well as in some of the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Ethnic
German minorities have lived -and albeit in much reduced numbers still live -in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
As Stefan Wolff has pointed out, the reasons for the historical and continued presence of ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe are due to three at times interrelated processes of conquest and colonization, migration and border changes.
German settlers, for instance, moved to Bohemia (now Czech Republic) and parts of what is now Romania (Transylvanian Saxons) as colonizers in the 12 th and 13 th centuries.
There were also mass migrations of German colonizers to the Russian Empire, invited by The Siebenbürger Sachsen first arrived in present-day Transylvania in the twelfth century as settlers from mainly the region of Moselle-Franconia in Western Germany. 4 Most academic literature on the topic suggests that the majority of early settlers colonized the area following a call by the Hungarian King Géza II (1141-1162) acting as "defenders" of Christianity and, later, of the Kingdom of Hungary. 5 This position also guaranteed a set of privileges that lasted into the nineteenth century. 6 However, it was a second wave of settlers in the sixteenth century -made up of former Hansa traders and other Burghers -that transformed Transylvania into a truly "modern" region. 7 This wave of migration helped to cement the Saxon position within the flourishing financial sector and also led to the conversion of Saxons to Protestantism. 8 This then determined Transylvania's official makeup of society. Three distinct groups (Hungarians, Szekler, and Saxons) were recognized as nations (nationes), and were thus granted particular privileges. 9 The rise of nationalism across the wider region in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century began to undermine the existing social order. In this environment, Saxons felt increasingly marginalized as their privileges were being gradually eroded from several quarters. 10 The 18 The end of the war therefore also marked the beginning of the dissolution of the Romanian German communities.
Of the 750,000 Germans living in present-day Romania at the beginning of the twentieth century roughly 250,000 were Saxons. Following World War Two, this figure declined considerably. 19 In January 1945, around 75,000 ethnic Germans between the ages of 17 and 45 were deported for up to five years to the Soviet Union to carry out what was called reconstruction work. 20 Those Germans who stayed behind in Romania were also subjected to harassment and persecution in the immediate post-war period. 21 Romanian German property was expropriated and deportations within Romania continued right into the 1950s. Republic of Germany. 24 While their integration into Germany has been far smoother than, for example, the Russlanddeutsche (Russian Germans) or indeed many non-ethnic German immigrants, their position in German society has left many of them in a void. 25 Far from "returning" to Germany, many Romanian Germans have experienced the disintegration of their original communities in Romania and have come to recognize that their image of Germany did not match the realities they encountered.
A welcoming homeland? West Germany's external minority policy
By 1950, around 12 million ethnic German refugees and expellees from Central and Eastern Europe had migrated to Germany, i.e. all occupation zones/both German states.
Although there were some refugees and expellees in the Soviet zone/East Germany, 26 the majority fought their way to the Western zones/the FRG, at least eventually. In proportion to the population as a whole, however, the East had 25% refugees and expellees whereas the West only had 16%. The refugees -who were after all fleeing from the advances of the Red Army -were unlikely to want to stay in areas that already were or were likely to come under Soviet control. Many of the refugees and expellees, whom the Allies had assigned to live permanently in the GDR, thus decided to leave for the West while the border was still permeable, i.e. before the Wall was built in 1961. Even though their numbers caused significant pressure on scarce resources in the Soviet zone, particularly in the early years after the war, in absolute terms their numbers were much lower than in West Germany.
Domestically, the main challenge for West Germany was the economic and social integration of these large numbers of migrants. 27 Externally, however, 32 In view of the generous nature of the West German citizenship law vis-à-vis ethnic Germans, it is hardly surprising that the impression gained prominence that Germany was indeed welcoming its diaspora "home". The expellee organizations (Landsmannschaften) further contributed to constructing the image of a "homeland" that was warmly welcoming its ethnic minorities from abroad. As the following section will show, it was by and large possible to maintain this image until the collapse of communism in the late 1980s.
Maintaining the myth of the homeland
It is of particular interest to note that Transylvanian Saxons chose the Federal Republic of Germany as their "external homeland". 33 As mentioned above, this was partly due to a longer term connection with Germany, but also due to pragmatic reasons and the special circumstances created by the new political climate in Cold War Europe. Far from limiting the links between West Germany and Romania, the political division in Europe during the Cold War in fact strengthened ties with Germany. Visits from relatives and to the West, letter writing, and Western goods all contributed to the hardening of specific images of the Saxons' external homeland. 34 Furthermore, as more and more Germans left Romania, the pressure grew on the dwindling community to follow suit. This then culminated in the mass exodus of the 1980s and early 1990s, 35 which had a "feedback effect" (Rückkoppelungseffekt) on the German communities and the infrastructure in Romania.
36
The cross-border connections and exchanges between Romanian German émigrés in Germany and non-émigrés in Romania generated a rather serene and romanticized image of West Germany amongst those Germans still living in Romania. For many Saxons, (West) Germany represented both the "free" West and the notion of a Kulturnation. The classical works of Goethe, Lessing, or Kleist, combined with Western consumerism, helped construct a rather skewed view of Germany and German society.
Although German books were available in Romania, friends and relatives often brought literature with them as gifts. This then added to a heavily romantic image of Germany, one which led Siebenbürger Sachsen to imagine Germany "in terms of Goethe and Schiller". 37 Both contemporary sources of the period before mass emigration and subsequent interviews with Romanian Germans point to a proliferation of images of an historic Germany, which were transposed onto West Germany. While studies have highlighted the construction and carriers of said images, particularly though not exclusively in the first few decades of the Cold War, 38 interviews with Saxon émigrés have exhibited the same use of such an imagined Germany when recalling the process of contemplating emigration. 39 The FRG was thus used as a point of reference -the GDR was excluded from this for political reasons -and as a means to critique their lives in communist Romania. Shortage was juxtaposed with abundance, Romanian and "Balkan" conduct with German high culture, and surveillance with political freedom. 
Still a community of Germans?
Whereas West German laws which allowed ethnic Germans to gain full citizenship worked well while communist party states in Central and Eastern Europe severely restricted the number of ethnic Germans they would allow to emigrate, things became more difficult when these restrictions on emigration were eased after 1989. And whereas West German policy until 1989 towards ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe but also the GDR was mainly concerned with helping as many as the respective regimes would allow to migrate to the Federal Republic, usually against hard currency, united
Germany's policy towards its diaspora started to concentrate on significantly reducing the influx of ethnic German migrants by ensuring that they would be granted minority rights in their respective countries and ensuring financial support for initiatives aimed at improving their lives there. This was only in part aimed at helping ethnic Germans abroad by stabilizing their situation there, however. It was clearly also self-serving in the sense that it was aimed at easing the pressure on Germany's resources due to the largescale migration of ethnic Germans into the country.
With the collapse of communism in Eastern and Central Europe and German unification in 1990, the rationale for keeping ius sanguinis had disappeared. With
German unification all former GDR citizens had turned into citizens of the Federal
Republic and with the transition to democracy of the countries in Eastern and Central
Europe, there was no more need for granting ethnic Germans privileged access to Germany on human rights grounds.
With the large-scale migration of ethnic Germans to the Federal Republic which had become possible after the fall of communism, the paradox of Germany's citizenship law based on ius sanguinis had also become ever more apparent since it granted descendants of ethnic Germans -whose families might never have set foot in German
Lands since the twelfth century -German citizenship, whereas Turkish "guest workers" who migrated to Germany from the 1960s onwards and their children -even if they were actually born in Germany -were unable to gain German citizenship.
In view of this, a consensus emerged that Germany's citizenship law had to be changed. With the fall of the wall it was considered to be too easy for German Aussiedler to gain citizenship and too hard for those immigrants like the Turkish "guest workers"
who had lived and worked in (West) Germany for decades. Neither the "guest workers" themselves nor their children, even if they were born in Germany, were eligible for The form required information and details regarding the applicants' command of
German, e.g. whether it was spoken at home. These forms were then passed on to Germany where initial decisions were made. Once their status was approved provisionally and they were allowed to enter Germany on that basis, their Aussiedler status had to be confirmed. Looking at the numbers after 1990, this law appears to have had an immediate effect in terms of reducing the influx into Germany. Whereas 1990 still saw just over 397,000 Aussiedler gaining German citizenship, in 1991, the figure had nearly halved and gone down to around 222,000. repatriates"), further tightened the conditions to qualify for this status. "Germanness" in terms of language skills and the preservation of German culture and customs now had to be demonstrated and was to only apply to ethnic Germans who were born before 1 January 1993. Furthermore, evidence of discrimination was required and conditions for relatives of approved and confirmed Spätaussiedler to also migrate to Germany were made much more rigorous. In 1996 a further piece of legislation ruled out the free choice of place of residence for the initial period of the migrants' stay.
On the whole, the measures taken in the early 1990s made it much harder for ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe to qualify for German citizenship. On the one hand, the criteria to qualify for German citizenship became more stringent and the number of Aussiedler that could be admitted annually was capped at 220,000. On the other hand, migration was made a lot less attractive since benefits for Aussiedler had been significantly reduced, in terms of the financial help to which they were entitled, but also in terms of language courses and other programs that used to support their integration in German society. 46 It is debatable whether these measures achieved the desired effect or whether the respective diasporic communities had simply shrunk to a degree that more emigration was simply not possible. In any case, numbers have clearly Far from encountering the land of Goethe and Schiller, many Saxons came across a "westernized" country that did not resemble the image that had been conjured up during the Cold War (and in fact predated that period, too). The affluence for which many yearned was gradually reinterpreted as decadence, and the contemporary culture they witnessed was viewed with skepticism. 51 More important, however, were the contrasting and often contradictory memories many Saxon émigrés were confronted with. Having left what many perceived to be an anti-German environment in which anti-fascism determined public discourses on the past, the majority of émigrés arrived in (West)
Germany during the "boom" of Holocaust memory. 52 This has proved to be a slightly perplexing experience for some Saxons, as this has been interpreted as a challenge to their own strong notion of victimhood and their depoliticized memory of Saxon involvement during the war. Moreover, the absence of a critical forum in which to discuss, publicly at least, experiences during communism in Romania has left sections of the émigré community feeling marginalized in reunified Germany.
The response to this has been varied: One option has been to retreat into online forums devoted to matters of interest for Transylvanians. 53 Tellingly, these online discussions have tended to centre on issues in their former homeland Romania and not so much on current developments in Germany, even though the majority of users live in has been viewed as part of his "social engagement" (soziales Engagement) with the region. 57 Since Saxons have not really had to contend with problems of integration in Germany, the reasons for this reinvention of Romania must therefore lie elsewhere.
Certainly the increasing emergence of "transnational awareness" in projects such as heritage conservation has played its part. 58 It is also true to say that prominent figures such as Peter Maffay have contributed towards a greater responsiveness amongst Saxon émigrés in Germany towards their previous homeland. 59 Yet at the heart of this reimagining lies the breakdown of previously established images of Germany following emigration.
What does this tell us about shifting notions of citizenship and identity in the Berlin Republic? First of all, it points to the fact that this renegotiating of the Saxon relationship with Germany and Romania is not merely a form of nostalgia -that is the longing for a bygone era -but about the physical constitution of their former homeland.
Unlike phenomena such as Ostalgie in the former GDR where the past is reimagined as a critique of the present, Saxon re-engagement with Romania has not been about rehabilitating the past. 60 The loss of homeland thus also refers to the physical and not just temporal loss of it. This has been echoed in a large number of publications on the natural geography and architecture of Saxon Transylvania. 61 Saxons are remembering the appearance of Saxon Transylvania as a counterpoint to the urban experience in (West)
Germany in much the same way that West Germany acted as a counterpoint to their experiences in Romania. Whilst West Germany was once an idealized version of an historic Germany, Transylvania has, to some extent, become re-imagined as a place bound up with a harmonious past. 62 Exploring Rogers Brubaker's model of a minority's triangular relationship with its external and actual homelands a little further, the case of Transylvanian Saxons suggests that home has always been located elsewhere. 63 Their role as a minority has led Saxons to retain a certain distance towards their respective actual homeland (be it Romania or Germany). Home is thus never the actual homeland, but the other, external and imagined homeland. It is in this context that Romania and (in particular) Transylvania has become such a focal point for the émigré community of Saxons in Germany.
Yet this reimagining of a lost homeland has not merely been about the loss of territory. It has also served as a commentary on the disappointment which sections of the émigré community have experienced since immigration to Germany. As discussed above,
Transylvanian Saxons left Romania with the distinct impression of being subjected to an anti-German public narrative. 64 However, whilst Saxons had expected a wave of sympathy from fellow Germans, they quickly found themselves lumped in with right- st century still seem to suffer from a mutual disconnect. While there does seem to be more space for the "critical engagement" with the past that many Saxons have been calling for, the émigré community itself seems once again torn between two homelands and various strands of identity. In so doing, they have moved from diaspora to diaspora.
